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ABSTRACT
Many states have passed laws mandating insurance companies to provide or offer some form of
mental health benefits. These laws presumably lower the price of obtaining mental health services
for many adults, and as a result, might improve health outcomes. This paper analyzes the
effectiveness of mental health insurance mandates by examining the influence of mandates on adult
suicides, which are strongly correlated with mental illness. Data on completed suicides in each state
for the period 1981-2000 are analyzed. Ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares results
show that mental health mandates are not effective in reducing suicide rates.
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Mental illnesses are debilitating diseases affecting millions of people each year.  These 
conditions constituted five of the top ten leading causes of disability worldwide in 1990, 
measured in years lived with a disability.  Unipolar depression is the largest cause of disability 
(Murray and Lopez 1996).  Despite the severity of the burden of mental illness, many cases of 
mental disorders remain untreated.  Estimates show that about 28 percent of the U.S. adult 
population in any year has a diagnosable mental or addictive disorder, yet only 8 percent seeks 
treatment (USDHHS 1999). 
In response to the increasing scope of the problems associated with mental illness, 
coupled with improvements in the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders, a number of 
states and the federal government have taken steps to improve access to mental illness services in 
the form of mandated mental health benefits, including mental health parity laws.  These laws 
have the potential to lower the effective price of mental health services, increasing utilization.  
However, it is possible these laws might raise the cost of providing insurance thereby reducing 
access.   
Evaluating the effectiveness of mental health insurance mandates requires analysts to 
answer three major questions: 1) do mandates successfully lower the price of obtaining mental 
health services; 2) do mandates increase access to mental health services; and 3) do mandates 
contribute to improvements in mental health outcomes?  Conclusive answers to these questions 
are elusive, primarily because work in this area suffers from significant data limitations.  While 
existing research provides some insights into the first two questions, no research to date attempts 
to answer the third question. 
This paper examines the question of whether or not mandates directly contribute to 
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 improvements in mental health.  The answer to this question is crucial to policymakers at the 
state and federal levels as they consider implementing and expanding mental health insurance 
mandates.  The results of this study provide evidence of the impact of mental health and 
substance abuse treatment mandates, including parity laws, on adult suicides, a measurable 
outcome of poor mental health.  In considering the efficacy of mental health mandates in 
reducing suicides, instrumental variables are used to control for potential simultaneity between 
suicide rates and mandate adoption.  The results indicate that mental health mandates are 
exogenous, and they are also ineffective in reducing suicide rates.  
In the sections that follow, background information is provided regarding the impetus for 
the mental health insurance mandate movement, as well as a discussion of prior analyses of the 
effects of mandates.  We then discuss research design, data, and empirical results, concluding 
with directions for future research. 
 
BACKGROUND 
   Although a few states enacted mental health insurance mandates in the 1970s and 1980s, 
a nationwide push for mandates, especially so-called mental health parity mandates, began in 
earnest in the early 1990s.  Mental health parity laws require insurers to provide parity in 
coverage between mental health and physical health coverage.  These laws typically prohibit 
insurance companies from offering plans that place greater financial burden on access to 
diagnostic or treatment services for mental health conditions than for physical health conditions.  
Such laws are designed to lower the price of mental health services faced by insured individuals, 
improve access to treatment, and ultimately to improve mental health outcomes.  Other types of 
laws include mandated mental health benefits and mandated mental health benefit offerings. 
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 By 2002, forty-six states mandated some form of mental health benefit, but the specifics 
of those laws vary widely.  Some require full parity in which insurers must provide mental health 
benefits at exactly the same terms applying to physical health benefits.  Other mandates simply 
require that a minimum level of mental health coverage be provided or offered, with varying 
equivalence requirements and pricing restrictions.  Further, some states define mental illness 
broadly, applying their mandates to virtually any illness listed in the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, while other states limit the conditions covered 
by the laws to a few “biologically based” illnesses, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and 
major depressive disorders. Some states have exemptions for small businesses and large cost 
increases.  One particularly visible distinction is whether or not the laws cover treatment for 
substance abuse and addiction.  Roughly half of the states with mandated mental health benefits 
explicitly include addiction treatment, while about a quarter explicitly exclude it from the 
mandate.  
In addition to the success in passing mandates at the state level, mental health advocates 
argue that federal mental health parity legislation is necessary.  Many employers are unaffected 
by state insurance regulations due to the federal pre-emption granted by the Employee 
Retirement Security Act (ERISA) of 1974.  ERISA effectively pre-empts state regulation of self-
funded health insurance plans.  That is, ERISA disallows individual states from imposing health 
insurance mandates of any kind on any firm that self-insures.  Self-insured plans are typical of 
large employers, and as a result, employees of large companies are not likely to benefit from 
state mandates regarding mental health benefits.   These self-insured plans represent about one-
third of workers with employment-based insurance (EBRI 2000).  
The federal Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, which became effective in 1998 and was 
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 eventually extended through the end of 2002, was passed to fill the regulatory gap created by the 
ERISA exemption.  The federal parity mandate prohibited group health insurers providing 
mental health benefits from imposing annual and lifetime expenditure limits for mental health 
treatments that are stricter than those applying to physical health treatments.  However, this law 
did not impose any conditions on deductibles, copayments, or days covered, nor did it include 
provisions for substance abuse treatment.  More important, the law did not require employers to 
offer mental health coverage, leaving employers the option of dropping mental health benefits 
altogether.  The law also contained two major exemptions.  The first exempted small employers 
with 50 of fewer employees.  In 2000, small firms employed approximately 28 percent of the 
labor force.  The second exemption arose if the law resulted in a cost increase of at least one 
percent of medical costs.    
 
EXISTING EVIDENCE ON EFFECT OF MANDATES 
The extent to which mental health mandates improve the welfare of individuals with 
mental illnesses is ambiguous.  Although supporters of the mandates deem them necessary to 
solve apparent “market failures” in the provision of mental health insurance, there is conflicting 
evidence on the issue of whether coverage mandates improve access to mental health services. 
  Shortly after a number of states enacted minimum mental health benefit laws, researchers 
began to evaluate the effectiveness of such laws on access to care.  McGuire and Montgomery 
(1982) examined the impact of the laws on hours of practice by fee-for-service psychiatrists and 
psychologists in 1978.  Their findings suggest that mental health mandates increase service use, 
but these estimates are statistically insignificant.  Using a panel of states during the 1970s, Frank 
(1985) reaches a similar conclusion in his study on visits to psychiatrists.  He finds that mental 
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 health mandates increase the demand for services by 12-22 percent, but again, these estimates are 
imprecise.  Horgan (1986) finds that mandated private insurance coverage increases the 
probability of using ambulatory mental health services in the specialty sector, while simply 
mandating the availability of benefits has no effect on use.   She also finds that neither mandated 
private insurance coverage nor mandated availability of benefits has any effect on the number of 
visits among users who have out-of-pocket expenses for mental health treatment.   
Opponents of insurance mandates in general often claim that mandates increase the cost 
of insurance, inducing employees or firms to drop health insurance altogether (Economic Report 
of the President 1991).  Gruber (1994) presents evidence that this displacement effect of 
mandates is virtually non-existent.  Using data from the May CPS supplements data 1979, 1983 
and 1988, Gruber finds that state mandates to cover certain health services, including alcohol, 
drug abuse and mental illness, have no impact on the probability that an employee of a small 
firm is covered by health insurance.   There is some evidence, however, that alcohol treatment 
mandates lower the probability that a small firm will offer insurance.  Gruber explains that 
mandates in general might be ineffective since firms generally offer benefits that exceed the 
mandated minimums. 
  Kaestner and Simon (2002) also examine the displacement effect of state health mandates 
on the private provision of health insurance benefits by small employers.   Focusing on the total 
number of health mandates in a state, they find that such mandates have no impact on the 
prevalence of health insurance coverage for full-time and part-time employees in small firms.  A 
similar conclusion is reached when examining the joint effect of four high-cost mandates;  drug 
treatment, alcohol treatment, mental health care and mental health parity.   
Parity mandates, however, might generate different effects than minimum benefit 
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 mandates since they tie mental health benefits to physical health benefits.  That is, parity 
mandates do not only affect the cost of providing insurance for mental health treatments, they 
also indirectly affect the cost of providing traditional health insurance.  If a firm wishes to 
increase its physical health benefits, parity mandates require a concomitant increase in mental 
health benefits as well.  This joint determination generates an ambiguity in the effect of mandates 
on access to mental health treatments. 
  Some researchers suggest that the costs of increased mental health benefits are at least 
partially offset by the benefits employers enjoy due to improved mental health among their 
workers.  The financial offset argument claims that providing mental illness coverage reduces 
other costs borne by employers.  England (1999) makes this case with respect to depression, 
claiming that employers lost $24 billion due to lost work time and productivity in 1993 as a 
result of untreated depression among their employees.  Olfson et al. (1999) note that these 
indirect cost savings might be particularly important with respect to treatments for alcoholism, 
citing evidence that early treatment of the disorder can eliminate many costs due to alcohol-
induced long term physical health disorders, such as cirrhosis, cardiomyopathy, and chronic 
hepatic encephalopathy. 
In resolving this theoretical ambiguity, it is difficult to ascertain the causal effects of 
mandates on access to mental health services because adoption of the mandates appears to be 
endogenous to underlying state characteristics, which also affect access to care.  For example, 
Sturm and Pacula (1999) document that states with below average use rates of mental health 
services are more likely to pass mandates, and, even after adoption, those states continue to lag 
behind national averages.  Recognizing this simultaneity, Pacula and Sturm (2000) use a two-
stage procedure on a sample of individuals over a one-year period to estimate the impact of 
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 parity laws on mental health service utilization.  They find no difference in the level of mental 
health service utilization among people living in states with parity laws compared to those living 
in states without parity laws.  They speculate that this finding is generated by an insurance 
displacement effect for high-risk individuals.  A major problem with such individual level data is 
that details of the respondent’s employment situation and/or health insurance coverage are often 
unknown.  This information is vital given that many insurance plans are exempt from state 
mandates and the lack of such information can bias results.  
Sturm (2000) uses data from the Health Tracking Initiative, which is designed to track 
changes in health care over time, to analyze the effect of parity laws on insurance coverage for 
individuals with mental health disorders.  Using a difference-in-difference estimation strategy, 
this study finds that mentally ill individuals living in states with parity laws are more likely to 
lose insurance coverage, although the benefits for those retaining coverage is generous and 
access to care is easier.  These estimates, however, are small in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant.   
The presumption against the efficacy of mandates is strengthened by results suggesting 
that access to mental health services has increased even in the absence of mandates.  Zuvekas et 
al. (2002) find that while treatment prevalence increased by 50 percent in one employer group 
during the three year period after mental health parity mandates were enacted, a similar increase 
occurred in employer groups that were not subject to the mandate.  Research on the effects of the 
federal mental health parity law has shown very few changes in plans as a result.  The Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration found that almost half of all eligible 
employers were already in compliance with the act prior to its effective date.  Sixty-eight percent 
of the plans reported no change in benefits as a result of the law, and almost none chose to drop 
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 mental health coverage (SAMHSA 1999). 
  Dissimilarities in treatments between mental illness and physical illness also induce some 
limitations on the effect of parity laws in improving access to mental health services.  Frank et al. 
(2001) point out that many important aspects of mental health treatments have no counterpart in 
standard medical care, leaving them unaffected by parity laws.  For example, many health 
insurance plans do not cover residential treatment programs or day-hospital care.  In some cases, 
these components of treatment might be necessary for effective mental health treatment.  A 
General Accounting Office (2000) survey indicates that many employers compensate for the 
changes in limits by imposing restrictions on aspects of mental health treatment not covered in 
the federal parity mandate. 
  It is an open question then as to whether mental health insurance mandates improve the 
welfare of those facing mental illnesses.  Direct evidence about the effect of mandates on the 
benefits provided to employees does not resolve the questions about the efficacy of mental health 
mandated benefits and parity laws.  
 
ANAYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The model of mental health used is derived from Grossman (1972) and involves a mental 
health production function and input demand functions: 
1)  M=m(Tm, A, D, µ), 
Equation 1 posits that good mental health (M) is a function of mental health treatment (Tm), 
alcohol and/or drug consumption (A), demographic and socio-economic factors (D), and 
unobserved individual factors, which might include a genetic endowment of health (µ).  It is 
assumed that alcohol and drug consumption have a negative impact on good mental health 
  8 
 whereas treatment has a positive impact.
1   
Alcohol and drug consumption, as well as treatment services face the following demand 
functions: 
2)  A=a(M, Ta, Pa, Y, D, µ). 
3)  Tm=t(A, Ptm, Y, D, µ), 
4)  Ta=t(A, Pta, Y, D, µ), 
Equation 2 represents the demand function for alcohol or drugs where consumption is 
determined by mental illness, price (Pa), income (Y), demographic factors and unobserved 
individual factors.  Consumption can be lowered through substance abuse treatment services 
(Ta).  Equations 3 and 4 are demand functions for mental health and substance abuse treatment 
services, respectively.  Here, treatment levels are determined by drug and alcohol consumption, 
prices (Ptm, Pta), income, demographic factors and unobserved individual factors.  The prices of 
treatment faced by individuals may be affected by insurance coverage. 
A reduced form model of mental health serves as the basis for empirical estimation: 
5)  M=m(Ptm, Pta, Pa, Y, D, µ). 
Equation 5 is derived by substituting equations 2, 3 and 4 into equation 1.  The estimation of 
equation 5 will show the direct effectiveness of reductions in mental health and substance abuse 
treatment prices in improving mental health status.   
Mandates are intended to lower the price of obtaining mental health and substance abuse 
treatment services, therefore, indicators for the presence of these laws in each state will be used 
to represent price.  Mandate adoption will serve as a proxy for changes in the price of treatment 
through changes in insurance coverage. 
                                                 
1 There exists a complex relationship between substance use and mental illness, with many researchers believing that 
substance use contributes to deteriorating mental health (Egelko et al. 2002; Havassy and Arns 1998). 
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EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
In order to estimate equation 5, a valid measure of mental health is needed.  Previous 
studies examine the impact of mental health parity laws on mental health service utilization 
(Pacula and Sturm 2000; Zuvekas et al. 2002) and insurance coverage (Sturm 2000), but none 
has looked directly at mental health outcomes.  We take this approach and use a measurable 
outcome of mental health services, suicide.  Suicide is a useful outcome for a number of reasons.   
First, suicide is strongly correlated with mental illness.  Researchers believe that almost 
all individuals who commit suicide have a diagnosable mental disorder (Maris et al. 1992).  It 
has been estimated that two-thirds of people who commit suicide have a depressive illness; 5 
percent suffer from schizophrenia; and 10 percent meet the criteria for other mental illnesses 
including borderline personality disorder.  However, only half of people who die by suicide 
receive any mental health treatment in their lifetimes (Maltsberger 1992; Clark and Horton-
Deutsch 1992).    
Second, parity legislation is often intended primarily to benefit the most severely ill 
patients (Sturm 2000).  For example, the federal law only affected annual and lifetime dollar 
limits, which are likely to be reached only by the severely ill.  The risk of suicide is highly 
correlated with the intensity of treatment.  Simon and Von Korff (1998) find that among insured 
patients receiving treatment for depression, the highest risk of suicide was among those receiving 
inpatient treatment and medication.  The lowest risk was found among individuals receiving 
outpatient treatment without medication.   
Lastly, suicide is related to both substance use and mental illness.  Since many of the 
mental health mandates include both substance abuse and mental health treatment, a desirable 
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 health outcome is related to both substance use and mental illness.  Suicide meets this criterion.  
Alcohol abuse disorders are found in approximately 25 percent of completed suicides cases, and 
20-25 percent of suicide victims are intoxicated at the time of death (Murphy 1992; Goldsmith et 
al. 2002). 
For the conclusions of this study to be useful, not only must the demand for treatment be 
affected by parity laws, but treatment itself must affect the suicide rate.  Previous research in 
economics has shown that the treatment of mental illness is responsive to price, and while the 
elasticity of demand is fairly inelastic, it has been estimated to be more price responsive than 
general health (see Frank and McGuire 2000 for a review of the literature).  The answer to the 
question of whether treatment is successful in lowering suicides is much more elusive.  It is 
nearly impossible to estimate how many suicides are avoided through the provision of mental 
health services, although advances in psychopharmacology have often been credited with 
improving mental health outcomes and suicide rates.  For example, a recent study of suicides in 
Australia found a strong, negative correlation between suicides and sales of antidepressants (Hall 
et al. 2003).   The reduction in suicide rates might be a result of the use of the drugs, or it might 
reflect increased diagnosis and treatment of depression by psychiatrists or general practitioners, 
since the prescription of antidepressants is typically accompanied by other interventions such as 
counseling which may also reduce suicides.  
Each state’s suicide rate for adults ages 25-64 is used as the measure of the mental health 
status of each state’s population.  Data on completed suicides come from the National Center for 
Health Statistics’s Compressed Mortality File, which contains information on all completed 
suicides over time.  These data are collected from death certificates filed in each state and 
include the state of residence, age, race, and gender of each individual.   
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 Focusing on the suicide rates as a measure of mental health, the empirical equation takes 
the following form: 
(6) suicide rateit = α1 mandateit + α2 psychit + α3 large firmit + α4 uninsuredit +  
α5 medicaidit +  ΘX + λi + τt + εit 
where the dependent variable is the adult suicide rate in state i during year t.  The primary 
covariate of interest is the mental health mandate variable, which is an indicator taking the value 
of one if state i has a mandate during year t and zero otherwise.  As described below, three 
different mandate categories are examined.  Next, the per-capita number of psychiatrists is 
included, as are the fraction of state i’s workforce employed in large firms during year t (large 
firms), the fraction of state i’s population without insurance during year t (uninsured), and the 
fraction of state i’s population on Medicaid during year t (medicaid).  The vector X represents 
other state-specific characteristics that might be related to suicide rates.  Time invariant state 
effects (λ) are included, as well as year effects (τ) that are common to all states during time t. 
There exist tremendous differences in the scope and provisions of mental health 
insurance mandates across states and time.  Using categories created by the National Conference 
of State Legislatures and consulting the state statues, the state laws are grouped into three mental 
health mandate categories (NCSL 2003).  The first mental health mandate is a very broad 
category termed “any mental health mandate” and includes all states that have some type of 
mandate in effect.  The laws could apply to all insurance plans or only to plans that offer mental 
health benefits.  It includes those laws requiring that mental health benefits be provided on parity 
with physical health benefits and those laws that simply require a minimum level of mental 
health coverage be provided or merely offered.  The second category represents laws mandating 
that all health insurance plans provide mental health benefits.  Termed “required mental health 
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 benefit,” this category is different than the first in that firms must provide benefits.  This measure 
includes the states with parity laws and the many states and time periods for which the mandated 
benefits are not necessarily on parity with physical health.  The last indicator is termed “parity 
law” and represents those state laws that require the provision of mental health benefits on parity 
with physical health.  Note that according to this definition, parity might apply to cost sharing, 
days, and/or lifetime and annual limits.
2,3       
  We caution that it is difficult to categorize the various mental health insurance mandates 
into specific groupings in any consistent way, given the varying language used in the statutes.  
Even in cases where essentially the same wording is used, the interpretation of each statute is 
conditional on existing judicial precedent and the policies of regulatory agencies within the state.  
If we abstract away these institutional differences and focus on the plain language meaning of 
the statutes, it is still generally not possible to categorize the mandates in a principled way.  For 
example, although there is a temptation to treat mandatory benefit statutes differently from 
mandatory offering statutes, in many cases the difference is merely nominal.  That is, there is 
very little practical difference between a mandatory offer and a mandatory benefit as long as the 
pricing restrictions and benefit levels are equivalent, since under each regime a consumer will be 
covered for the stipulated services if he chooses to elect them.  With that in mind, in many ways, 
the general category of mandates is the least arbitrary, though it is unclear whether parsing the 
mandates would help us achieve greater precision in the estimates.  For this reason, we rely on 
multiple groupings to examine the robustness of our estimates.  
                                                 
2 Other studies and sources of the laws use different definitions for “parity” states.  For example, Sturm and Pacula 
(1999) include in the group of parity states those which require parity, but do not necessarily mandate benefits.   
3 A fourth category of laws was tested representing substance abuse treatment mandates.  Our characterization of 
these laws is incomplete, however, since a number of states have substance abuse treatment laws which are separate 
from their mental health benefits laws.   Analyzing the impact of these laws is beyond the scope of this paper, but is 
a subject for future research.   
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 The percent uninsured, the percent on Medicaid, and the percent employed by large firms 
are included in all models to help mitigate a potential bias resulting from heterogeneity in 
coverage.  The uninsured are not covered by the mental health mandates imposed on insurance 
companies, nor are other sub-populations such as people on Medicare and Medicaid.
4  Further, 
the ERISA pre-emption exempts all self-insured employers and their employees from the 
provisions of the state laws.   
Unfortunately, the suicide data cannot identify an individual’s coverage status, although 
we do include only those suicides by individuals under the age of 65 to eliminate any effect of 
the Medicare population on the results.  The fact that the suicide data include both covered and 
uncovered individuals effectively biases the results toward zero since, in theory, the estimated 
effect of a law is a weighted average of a zero effect (for those not covered) and the effect of 
those covered by the laws.  To capture some of this coverage heterogeneity, the percent of each 
state’s population that is uninsured and the percent covered by Medicaid are included in all 
models.  To account for the effect of ERISA pre-emption, the percent of a state’s workforce that 
is employed by large firms (over 500 employers) that are likely to fall under ERISA is included.  
Consistent data (cross sectional by state or time series within given states) on ERISA coverage 
are not available, however, large employers are much more likely to self-insure than smaller 
companies (EBRI 2000), therefore, the percent of employees in large firms may serve as a valid 
measure of scope of the ERISA exemption. 
Next, the number of psychiatrists per capita is included in all models.  This variable is 
important to include because it is likely to be correlated both with the suicide rate and the 
mandated benefits.  The number of psychiatrists might affect suicides by influencing the full 
                                                 
4 Medicare provides both inpatient and outpatient mental health benefits.  Medicaid also provides mental health 
services, but to varying degrees based on the state. 
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 price of receiving mental health treatment through availability of services, and it might influence 
the passage of mental health mandates through a strong lobbying effort.  We caution that this 
variable could be endogenous if the observed level reflects the overall mental health status of the 
state population, with more psychiatrists demanded in states with higher rates of mental illness.  
However, its inclusion helps to reduce the correlation of the mandates with the error term in the 
suicide equation, particularly in the OLS equations.  The endogeneity of mandates is discussed 
further below. 
Lastly, a number of other state-level variables are used as covariates to represent the 
demographic and socio-economic status of each state’s population.  These variables include the 
female labor force participation rate, the unemployment rate, real income per capita, the 
percentage of the population living in rural areas, the percentage of the population 25 years and 
over that has obtained a bachelor's degree, and the real (1982-1984 dollars) state excise tax on  
beer.  Previous research has found many of these state characteristics to be important determinants 
of suicide rates (see for example Maris et al. 1992; Cutler et al. 2001; and Markowitz et al. 2003).  
Descriptive statistics and sources for all variables are presented in Table 1. 
 
ESTIMATION ISSUES 
A simple population weighted OLS estimation of suicide rates on parity laws and state 
characteristics provides a baseline estimate of the effectiveness of the laws.  This specification 
might prove to be biased due to simultaneity between parity adoption and suicide rates. Sturm 
and Pacula (1999) find that parity legislation is more likely to be passed in states where mental 
heath service use is low, indicating a potential reverse causality from mental health outcomes to 
legislation.  It is possible that states with high suicide rates are more likely to pass parity 
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 legislation in response to the poor mental health status of the population.  Note that this 
proposition depends on the factors influencing legislators’ decisions to enact such mandates.  
Suicides are fairly rare events and are typically not publicized for fear of encouraging copycat 
deaths.  As a result, legislators might not be influenced by the suicide rate per se in passing 
mental health legislation.  Nevertheless, two-stage least squares (TSLS) will be used to test for 
and correct for the potential endogeneity in the parity laws.  The instruments used include 
variables relating to politics and policy.  
The first instrument is an indicator measuring whether or not the state has enacted an 
insurance mandate with respect to diabetes.  That is, many states, during the same time period 
used here, considered laws requiring insurers to cover medical treatments for diabetes, such as 
insulin, diabetes pills, and dialysis treatments.  Passage of a diabetes mandate is likely to be an 
indicator of a state’s willingness to mandate coverage in general and, accordingly, should be 
correlated with the passage of parity laws.  There is no reason to suspect that diabetes coverage 
and suicide rates are directly related. 
Next, the percent of each state’s congressional representatives that are Republican and 
the percent of Republicans in each state’s lower house are used in some specifications as 
additional instruments to capture the political preferences of a state’s voters.  These preferences 
are likely to be correlated with mandate adoption, and there is no reason a priori as to why they 
should be directly related to suicide rates.  In the empirical estimation, these variables have little 
predictive power in many specifications.  Angrist and Krueger (2001) discuss the bias in the two-
stage least squares coefficient as a result of weak instruments.  Reducing the number of 
instruments can reduce this bias, therefore, the results are shown for models that include and 
exclude these two Republican Party variables. 
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 All models include a series of dichotomous indicators for each state in order to account 
for any unobserved state-level factors that may influence both the mental health mandates and 
suicide rates.  One common problem in policy research with including these dummy variables is 
that they often are highly correlated with the variables of interest, leaving little independent 
variation for the instruments to detect.  As a robustness check of the results, models were also 
tested that exclude the state dummies and include instead a series of broader area indicators, each 
representing one of the nine census divisions of the country.  As expected, the predictive power 
of the instruments typically improve in these specifications, however, the overall conclusions of 
this paper remain unchanged (results available upon request). 
 
RESULTS 
Mandated benefit laws 
  Figure 1 shows the U.S. suicide rate for all adults ages 25-64.  This figure shows a 
distinct downward trend over time in the suicide rate.  Figure 2 shows the suicide rates over time 
in four states.  The rates in Maryland and Minnesota, which have mental health mandated 
benefits on parity with physical health, are compared to the rates in Iowa and Michigan, which 
had not enacted any mental health mandated benefits as of 2000.  The laws in Maryland and 
Minnesota are considered to be very comprehensive.  These laws in these states apply to all types 
of mental illnesses, have no small business or cost increase exemptions, and include substance 
abuse treatment.  Figure 2 shows that both Maryland and Minnesota experienced downward 
trends in the suicide rates after the enactment of the mental health parity laws, however, 
downward trends also existed during certain periods prior to the laws as well.  Indeed, Michigan, 
which has no mental health benefit laws, experienced a downward trend throughout the entire 
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 1981-2000 period.  Based on this simple picture, there is no suggestion that any decrease in the 
suicide rate can be attributed to the enactment of mental health parity laws.  Thus, we proceed 
with a more formal, multivariate analysis. 
  The results in Table 2 show the effect of the adoption of any mental health insurance 
mandate (columns 1-3) and required mental health benefits (columns 4-6).  In the OLS estimates 
presented in column 1, the effect of any mandate on the suicide rate is positive but not 
statistically significant.  Once the endogeneity of mandate adoption is accounted for through the 
use of instrumental variables, the results presented in columns 2 and 3 suggest that mental health 
mandates remain positively associated with the suicide rate.  However, only one of the TSLS 
coefficients is statistically significant and this is only at the 10 percent level (column 2).  The 
instruments prove to be reliable.  (First stage results are presented in Appendix Table 1.)  The 
diabetes mandate indicator is a statistically significant predictor of mental health mandates, as is 
the percent of Republicans in the state’s lower house.  The F-statistics show that the instruments 
are statistically significant, and the magnitudes are fairly large.  This indicates that it is unlikely 
that the models suffer from the problems of weak instruments.
5  In column 3, the 
overidentification statistic implies that the three instruments are appropriately excluded from the 
second stage equation and are not directly related to the suicide rate.  Interestingly, the Hausman 
tests in columns 2 and 3 cannot reject the consistency of the OLS estimates, therefore, we 
conclude that the OLS results are trustworthy and the mandated benefit laws do not appear to be 
endogenous to the suicide rates. 
  In the models shown in columns 4-6 of Table 2, the mandate indicator takes the value of 
one when a mental health benefit must be provided (the required mental health benefit indicator).  
                                                 
5 Bound et al. (1995) and others have noted that a low first stage F-statistic for the identifying instrumental variables 
may suggest that the TSLS estimates are no better than biased OLS estimates. 
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 Although the OLS estimate of the mandate coefficient is positive, it is small and statistically 
insignificant.  The TSLS estimates shown in columns 5 and 6 are negative, but again, are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  These TSLS results are not trustworthy as the F-
statistics on the instruments are not statistically significant, indicating the instruments are 
extremely weak predictors of required mandated benefits.  As a result, the Hausman test statistics 
can not be trusted, and provide little guidance as to whether or not this measure of mandated 
benefits is endogenous.   
  Table 3 presents regression results where the mandate indicator takes the value of one 
only in instances where mental health benefits must be provided on parity with physical health.  
The models in columns 1-3 include the same covariates and instruments as those in the previous 
table.  Unfortunately, as a result of extremely weak instruments, the TSLS results in columns 2 
and 3 cannot be trusted (first stage results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Appendix Table 
2).  Here, the F-statistics on the instruments are not statistically significant at conventional levels.  
The lack of predictive power in the first stage may result from the fact that no state enacted a 
mental health parity law prior to 1993, meaning that the parity law takes on a value of zero for all 
states in 12 years or in at least 60 percent of the observations.  In an attempt to improve the 
predictive power of the instruments, the models shown in columns 4-6 are estimated based on a 
sample that is limited to the years 1993-2000, the time period in which states began passing 
parity laws.  Here again, the OLS and TSLS estimates of the impact of the parity law on suicide 
rates are not statistically significant, although limiting the sample improves the first stage results.  
The instruments are statistically significant predictors of the passage of parity laws (columns 5 
and 6), the overidentification restrictions are valid (column 6), while the Hausman test does not 
reject the consistency of OLS (columns 5 and 6).  These results suggest that no relationship 
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 exists between parity laws and the adult suicide rate. 
The measures of the mental health mandates used in Tables 2 and 3 are dichotomous 
indicators representing the presence or absence of certain mandates.  An alternative way to 
present these results is to treat the mandates as mutually exclusive categories.  The models 
shown in Table 4 include three indicators of the different types of mandates.  As discussed 
above, we caution that these groupings are somewhat arbitrary and that the actual influence 
of the laws will depend tremendously on the details of the laws and the policies of regulatory 
agencies within the state.  Subject to this caveat, mandate 1 represents states with mandated 
offerings only, mandate 2 represents states with mandated benefits that are not required to be 
on parity with physical health, and mandate 3 represents states with mandated benefits that 
are on parity with physical health.  The omitted category represents states with no mandates.   
Ordinary least squares and TSLS models are presented for the full sample (columns 1 
and 2) and the sample limited to the years 1993-2000 (columns 3 and 4).  All three available 
instruments are used in order to achieve identification.  The discussion of the results in this 
table focuses on the OLS estimates since the statistics related to the TSLS estimates show 
that the instruments are valid (although their predictive power is very low in some cases), and 
the consistency of OLS cannot be rejected.  The results uniformly show that mandates 1 and 
3 are not statistically significant predictors of suicide rates, and the OLS magnitudes are 
small with the sign varying depending on the sample used.  By contrast, mandate 2, which 
represents required benefits that are not on parity with physical health, is positively related to 
the suicide rates in the OLS models spanning all years.  Here, the suicide rate in states having 
such a mandate is actually higher by almost 1 person per 100,000.  This results may be 
indicative of the displacement effect of insurance mandates where increased costs induce 
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 individuals and businesses to drop coverage.  When the sample is limited to 1993-2000, the 




  Overall, mandated benefit laws appear to have no influence on adult suicide rates.  The 
results in Tables 2-4 do show that some of the other state characteristics may help explain some 
of the variation in suicide rates across the full sample period.  For example, labor market 
characteristics and economic conditions may predict suicide rates.  Higher rates of female labor 
force participation are positively associated with suicides, as are higher unemployment rates.  Per 
capita income, however, appears to have little effect as the magnitude of the coefficients are 
extremely small and are statistically insignificant in models utilizing the full sample period, 
although the coefficients are negative and statistically significant in models using the 1993-2000 
period.  In addition, states with larger percentages of the population with college degrees tend to 
have lower suicide rates. 
  The number of psychiatrists per 100,000 population is positively associated with the 
suicide rate.  As discussed above, the interpretation of this result must be taken with caution as it 
is likely that the observed numbers of psychiatrists reflects the overall mental health status of the 
state population.  Next, larger percentages of the population without health insurance are 
associated with lower suicide rates.  The negative effect of uninsurance on suicide rates might 
arise if self-selection is present and people who do not buy insurance are a relatively healthy 
group.  For example, self-employed individuals are much more likely than wage-earners to be 
uninsured, yet Perry and Rosen (2001, 2003) find no discernable differences between these two 
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 groups in regards to physical health status, mental health status, and service utilization.  Lastly, 
larger percentages of the population on Medicaid are associated with higher suicide rates,   A 
positive effect may arise if the program fails to provide the level of access to care necessary to 
prevent suicides among this population, however, it is also likely that this effect may simply 




  This paper examines the potential for mental health insurance mandates to improve the 
mental health of the population as represented by the adult suicide rate.  Using three different 
measures of mental health mandates, the results suggest that mandates do little to reduce the 
suicide rate.  One of the primary difficulties in estimating the effects of mandated benefit laws on 
health outcomes is the potential endogenity of the laws.  Previous research has shown that mental 
health parity laws are more likely to be enacted in states with lower mental health utilization and 
presumably better mental health status.  Our research tests for such endogeneity, but finds little 
support for this claim when suicide rates are considered.   
  Using OLS and TSLS, the estimates employing the most general definition of what 
constitutes a mental health insurance mandate provide the most convincing and most robust 
results.  Indeed, there appears to be no statistically significant relationship between mandate 
adoption and adult suicides.  Partitioning the mandates into different categories provides a check 
on the robustness of this result.  Mandated offering laws and parity laws, which represent the 
majority of the different types of state laws, drive the overall results and each appear to have no 
effect on suicide rates.  However, the presence of mandated benefits that are not on parity with 
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 physical health benefits might increase the suicide rate.  This result is consistent with a 
displacement effect of mandates. 
  This study contributes to the growing consensus in the literature that mental health 
mandates do not accomplish their desired goals.  However, this research suffers from the 
problem of weak instruments with respect to some specific mandate classifications.  Another 
limitation of this research is that the outcome studied includes individuals who are not affected 
by mental health mandates, which could bias the results toward zero.  Despite these limitations, 
this research provides no evidence that mental health mandates reduce suicide rates.   At best, 
these mandates have no effect on this outcome.   
  This research raises many interesting questions.  A next step for research is to examine 
why these laws are not achieving improvements in mental health outcomes.  This paper points to 
a number of possibilities.  The design of the laws themselves might ensure no impact.  In states 
like Arizona and Kentucky, where minimum mental health benefits are required only if the plan 
provides any mental health benefits, firms and insurance companies have the incentive and the 
option to drop benefits if they are too costly.  Similarly, cost increase exemptions and small 
employer exemptions in a number of the state laws might prevent any of the mandates from 
being binding.  The design of the laws notwithstanding, it is also unclear what impact the 
mandates have on the cost of providing mental and even physical health insurance.  Rising 
premiums might encourage employers to raise employee contributions or to drop coverage 
altogether.  These questions are beyond the scope of this study, but are nonetheless important 
questions in determining whether mandated mental health benefits improve the mental health of 
the population. 
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 Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Selected Variables 
Variable Definition  Mean  Std  Dev  Source 
Adult suicide rate  Number of adult suicides ages 25-64, per 100,000 
population ages 25-64     16.41 4.16  NCHS 
 
Any mental health 
mandate 
Indicator = 1 if state has some form of a mental 
health insurance mandate in place, including parity 
mandate, benefit mandate, or offering mandate 




Indicator = 1 if state mandates health insurance 
plans to provide mental health benefits.  May or 
may not be on parity with physical health benefits 
0.11 0.31  NCSL and 
state statutes 
Parity 
Indicator =1 if state mandates health insurance 
plans to provide mental health benefits on parity 
with physical health 
0.06   0.24  NCSL and 
state statutes 
Labor force 
participation  Labor force participation rate of women  58.26  5.20  BLS 
Unemployment Unemployment  rate  6.05  2.20  BLS 
Real income  Per capita income adjusted for inflation  140.32  24.20  BEA 
Percent rural  Percent of state population living in rural areas  31.07  14.59  Census 
College degree  Percent of state population ages 25 years and older 
that has graduated from a 4-year college  20.38 4.65  Census 
Percent black  Percent of state population black  9.64  9.22  Census 
Beer tax  State excise tax on beer   0.51  0.19  Beer Institute 
Psychiatrists  Number of psychiatrists per 100,000 population  21.46  9.77  AMA 
Percent large 
employers 
Percent of state workforce in firms with 500 + 
employees  33.08 14.88 SBA 
Percent uninsured  Percent of state population with no health insurance  16.34  4.73  CPS 
Percent Medicaid  Percent of state population with Medicaid  8.73  3.47  CPS 
Diabetes law  Indicator = 1 if state has mandate requiring insurers 
to cover diabetes treatments  0.17 0.38  NCSL 
Congressional 
Republicans 
Percent of congressional delegation affiliated with 
Republican Party  0.48 0.29  STAT  AB 
State Republicans   Percent of Republicans in state lower house  0.44  0.17  STAT AB 
AMA:  American Medical Association 
BLS:  Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor 
BEA: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce 
Census:  U.S. Bureau of the Census 
CPS:  Current Population Survey, BLS and Bureau of the Census 
NCHS:  National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control 
NCSL:  National Conference of State Legislatures 
STAT AB:  Statistical Abstract 
SBA:  U.S. Small Business Administration 
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 Table 2 
OLS and TSLS Regressions 






















     
Required mental health 
benefit 










































































































































           
R-squared  0.903 0.868 0.898    0.903 0.554 0.507 
Overidentification test      4.349 
[0.114] 
     0.103 
[0.950] 
















Note: t-statistics in parentheses, p-values in brackets, and intercept not shown.  All models include state and year 
dummies. N=1,000.  The instrument in columns 2 and 5 is the diabetes mandate.  The instruments in columns 3 and 6 
are the diabetes mandate, the percent of Republicans in state lower house, and the percent of the state’s congressional  
delegation Republican. 
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 Table 3 
OLS and TSLS Regressions 

































































































































































           
R-squared  0.903 0.487 0.625    0.942 0.919 0.941 
Overidentification test      0.233 
[0.890] 
     2.114 
[0.348] 
















Note: t-statistics in parentheses, p-values in brackets, and intercept not shown.  All models include state and year 
dummies. N=1,000 in columns 1 and 2, N=400 in columns 3 and 4.  The instrument in columns 2 and 5 is the diabetes 
mandate.  The instruments in columns 3 and 6 are the diabetes mandate, the percent of Republicans in state lower 
house, and the percent of the state’s congressional  delegation Republican. 
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 Table 4 
OLS and TSLS Regressions 










  All years  All years  1993-2000  1993-2000 
















































































































         
R-squared  0.904 0.328    0.943 0.901 
Hausman test    6.520 
[0.089] 
   3.921 
[0.270] 




   0.680 
[0.566] 




   2.030 
[0.109] 




   8.89 
[0.000] 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses, p-values in brackets, and intercept not shown.  All models include state and year 
dummies. N=1,000 in columns 1 and 2, N=400 in columns 3 and 4.  The instruments in columns 2 and 4 are the 
diabetes mandate, the percent of Republicans in state lower house, and the percent of the state’s congressional  
delegation Republican.  Mandate 1 represents states with mandated offerings only.  Mandate 2 represents states 
with mandated benefits that are not on parity with physical health.  Mandate 3 represents states with mandated 
benefits that are on parity with physical health.  The omitted category represents states with no mandates. 
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Appendix Table 1 
First Stage Regressions 
 
  Any mental health mandate  Required mental health 
benefit 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4) 








Congress Republicans    -0.070 
(-0.94) 
   -0.012 
(-0.23) 
State Republicans    0.718 
(3.60) 
   0.003 
(0.02) 
























































































Note: t-statistics in parentheses, and intercept not shown.  N=1,000. 
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Appendix Table 2 






  (1) (2)    (3) (4) 








Congress Republicans    -0.036 
(-0.70) 
   0.006 
(0.05) 
State Republicans    -0.041 
(-0.29) 
   1.757 
(4.47) 
























































































Note: t-statistics in parentheses, and intercept not shown.  N=1,000 in columns 1 and 2, N=400 in 
columns 3 and 4. 
 